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Abstract  
By scrutinizing a specific type of local lists - interpreted as a local variant of ‘New Politics 
Parties’ - this paper aims to give an initial impetus to understanding the internal variations 
concealed by the all-purpose denominator of local lists. Local New Politics Parties are 
identified as local policy-seeking parties based on a grassroots democratic and post-material 
values. Based on a qualitative analysis of three local New Politics Parties their common 
characteristics, developments and strategies are analysed and clarified. These small parties’ 
quest for political relevance urges them to adopt office-seeking objectives, also implying a 
moderation of their profile and a move towards mainstream parties. In response to the 
increasing organizational costs of public office, as well as to societal changes local New 
Politics Parties are compelled to look for cooperation formulas with other political actors in 
the form of local cartels or by affiliating with a national (green) party.  
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1. Introduction 
Independent local lists play a significant role in European local politics (Reiser & Holtmann; 
2008). Belgium is no exception to this with local lists competing in a vast majority of 
municipalities. In the most recent local elections of 2006 local lists received about 20% of the 
votes in Flanders and 25 % in Wallonia with similar figures for their share of seats. 
Furthermore local list have been an important factor in the formation of local government 
coalitions in Belgium (Steyvers et al, 2009).  
However these figures give us no clue on the different types of local lists and consequently 
their differentiated consequences for local politics. The common denominator ‘local lists’ 
indeed covers a highly varied content, ranging from hidden national lists, to genuine local 
parties with several appearances in between (mayor lists, local cartels, one-issue parties, ...). 
In an attempt to conceptualize this internal variation Steyvers et al. (2009) developed a 
classification scheme based on nationalization and partisanship (NAPA-model). Yet this 
model lacks appropriate data to substantiate these theoretical assumptions for empirical 
research on local lists is still nascent. Moreover scarce academic research on local lists 
generally takes a quantitative perspective leaving little scope for qualitative nuance.   
Understanding the internal variation of local lists and the differentiated consequences for 
local politics requires an in-depth comprehension of their genesis and developments. Yet, the 
closed character of these party-internal processes and the barriers for providing detailed 
information pose a methodological challenge. A qualitative approach based on elite-
interviews appears to be the most appropriate methodology for studying these internal and 
politically sensitive processes. 
This paper is part of a broader PhD research into the differentiated meaning of local lists. 
During a first explorative phase a series of qualitative interviews with party-elites from local 
lists was conducted to uncover their political realities. An initial analysis of these explorative 
interviews unambiguously revealed a distinct sub-group of local lists based on shared content 
and style. It concerns rather small parties opposing the established local political culture in 
which individual and party interests are perceived to prevail. These parties stress the need for 
a different way of conducting politics with a discourse based on public interest and 
democratic participation processes. Given the obvious similarities with New Politics Parties 
as comprehensively described by several authors (Müller-Rommel, 1989; Poguntke, 1989; 
Ignazi, 1996) these local lists can be  interpreted as local New Politics Parties.  
These exploratory findings brought us to further elaborate on the specific nature of local New 
Politics parties. Three cases have been selected for detailed analysis of the origins, 
characteristics, impacts and developments of this type of local lists as well as their 
consequences for the local political realm.  
This paper will start by elaborating on a theoretical framework for analyzing local lists. This 
framework seeks to combine the NAPA model as suggested by Steyvers et Al. (2008) with 
existing theories on New Politics Parties (Müller-Rommel, 1989; Poguntke, 1989; Ignazi, 
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1996), adding some additional dimensions adopted from party literature (Pederson, 1982; 
Fiers, 1989; Katz & Mair, 1995; Wollinetz, 2008). Subsequently the three selected cases are 
described and analysed. In chapter four the occurrence of local New politics Parties as a 
specific type of local lists and their characteristics are discussed.. To conclude we open the 
discussion concerning their meaning for the local political realm and raise some suggestions 
for further research.  
2. Conceptual framework for analyzing local New Politics Parties 
New Politics Parties 
Explorative research on the internal variation of local lists has revealed a specific type of 
local lists which can be identified as a local variant of ‘New Politics Parties’. New Politics 
Parties originated in the eighties as a response to the need for more participation and a 
different way of conducting politics (Müller-Rommel, 1989; Poguntke, 1989). Ignazi 
describes the origins of New Politics Parties as follows: “Dissatisfaction with the ‘traditional’ 
internal mechanisms of the mass parties, with their bureaucratization, with the 
unresponsiveness of their leaders, with the insignificant role of individual members, with the 
absence of a sense of community, all pushed a portion of active, young, well-educated 
citizens to look for a different locus for expressing their wills. The demand for more 
instruments, more channels and more means of participating by a citizenry animated by the 
civic virtue of democratically influencing the decision-making process is at the basis of the 
development of these new parties” (Ignazi, 1996, p. 554). Moreover Ignazi argues New 
Politics Parties are a reaction to the waning capacity of traditional parties to exert their 
expressive function and to canalize the demands of the citizenry into policy programmes
1
. 
Since activists from social movements play an important role in the development of New 
Politics Parties Frankland, Lucardie en Rihoux (2008) refer to them as ‘amateur-activists 
parties’. 
According to Poguntke & Scarrow (1996) New Politics Parties could also be interpreted as 
‘anti-party parties’ given their anti-party discourse. However, at the same they warn for the 
lack of subtlety of this concept. Dissatisfaction with political parties and the resulting anti-
party discourse can have distinct backgrounds and connotations. An accurate understanding 
of the specific nature and in particular the normative structure of anti-party discourses is 
crucial for interpreting their meaning and their potentially (de)stabilizing impact on 
democracy. Poguntke (1996) distinguishes between general anti-party arguments (rejecting 
principally that politics should be based on competition between political parties) and specific 
anti-party arguments (rejecting specific parties or party systems) the latter being more 
moderate since they don’t question political parties as institution, but only the way in which 
specific parties or party systems function.  
                                                          
1
 Ignazi argues that not only New Politics Parties, but also the recent extreme-right parties are the outcome of 
identical structural circumstances. They both offer a different answer to the crisis of the expressive function of 
parties  
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Applying this distinction indicates that New Politics Parties should be interpreted as specific 
anti-party parties. Due to inadequate performance of traditional parties and unsatisfactory 
internal democratic rules, they aim for a better performance of the democratic system without 
questioning party-forms as such (Ignazio, 1996). They don’t doubt the democratic 
fundamentals of political parties and indeed join the party-political game as a functional 
equivalent of traditional parties.  
Local lists 
Local lists are generally identified by legal or nominal criteria, depending on the local 
context. Both criteria oppose local lists to local divisions of national parties, the latter serving 
as point of reference. Reiser and Holtmann (2008) suggest a minimal definition requiring 
local lists to have a focus on one and only one local jurisdiction and to be independent of 
national (or supra-local) parties. Simultaneously they leave no doubt that this definition 
conceals the vast internal variation within local lists. Steyvers et al. (2008) also point to the 
assumed heterogeneity underneath the common denominator of local lists in a Belgian 
context and suggest conceptual refinement by introducing two dimensions blurring somewhat 
the supposed distinction between local lists and national parties (figure 1). The first 
dimension in Steyvers’ (2008) NAPA-model classifies local lists according to their actual 
independence of national parties. A local name can indeed disguise more or less strong 
relations with a national party, as also suggested by Ackaert (2006, p 105-108). Therefore 
Steyvers et al. (2008) perceive the dichotomy between local lists and local divisions of 
national parties as a continuum with genuine local lists and national party branches on the far 
ends with several manifestations of pseudo-local phenomena in between (hidden branches of 
national parties, national factions, local cartels, …).  
Figure 1.: The NAPA-model of the local party system (Steyvers et Al., 2008) 
The second dimension introduced by the NAPA-model is the degree to which local lists 
behave as political parties and fulfil the functions generally accorded to political parties 
(partisanship) (Steyvers et al, 2008). Again the authors perceive a partisanship-continuum. 
On the one end we find local lists serving as functional equivalents of national party branches 
behaving as genuine local parties. The other end situates local lists who merely apply a party-
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like form as electoral device to gain representative power without performing any societal 
functions (constituency of independents). 
Local new Politics Parties are identified as a specific type of local list based on shared 
content and style and not on the degree of nationalisation and partisanship, however they can 
be interpreted as ‘local parties’ in the NAPA-model and further analysis will provide 
evidence for interpreting the nationalisation and partisanship dimension. After all the use of a 
local label is also a strategic instrument prompted by a variety of possible motives. The mere 
choice to face the voter under a local name reflects a desire to denationalize or to dissociate 
themselves more or less explicitly from traditional parties.  
Political parties 
Analysing local lists’ degree of partisanship is a complex matter since political parties are 
multifaceted subjects. Some additional concepts from party literature will be added to our 
framework concerning local lists’ as functional equivalents of political parties.  
Fiers’ (1998) concept of party-functions will be used for examining the extent to which local 
lists behave as political parties. He classifies party-functions into three main groups: 
programmatic (policy proposals), positional (recruitment and selection) and civil 
(communication with citizens) functions.  
Organizational aspects and internal power relations  can be analysed by looking at the 
different organizational faces and their respective roles referring to Katz and Mair’s (1993) 
differentiation between the Party in Central Office, the Party on the Ground and the Party in 
Public Office.  
Concerning the strategic goals of local lists a distinction is made between policy-seeking 
(maximizing policy impact), vote-seeking (maximizing the amount of votes) and office-
seeking parties (maximizing control over private benefits of government participation) 
(Müller and Strom, 1999; Wolinetz, 2008). Müller and Strom (1999) also indicated the 
difference between instrumental and intrinsic values of strategic goals pursued by political 
parties.  
Furthermore local lists should not only be studied as separate entities, their patterns of 
cooperation and competition should be considered as well. How do they relate to other 
(national and local) parties and what impact do they have on the local party system. 
Traditional literature (Sartori, 2005; Caramani, 2007) distinguishes between one-party 
systems, predominant party-systems (several parties, of which only one dominates 
government), two-party systems (two big parties alternating government) and multiparty 
systems (several parties negotiating varying coalitions). Multiparty systems can be moderate 
(centripetal competition) or polarized (centrifugal competition) with bipolar systems 
combining elements of multi- and two-party systems with opposing coalitions being the 
important players.  
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Dynamic perspective 
Given the presumed path-dependency of local lists’ characteristics a dynamic perspective 
should be used. Therefore we introduce a lifecycle approach, as suggested by Pederson 
(1982). Pederson (1982, p8) depicts the evolution of political parties by means of 4 crucial 
thresholds, determining the succeeding stages parties go through, starting with their naissance 
and ending with their disappearance, also involving the possibility to return to a previous 
stage. The subsequent phases of a party’s lifecycle are declaration (declaring the will to 
participate in elections), authorization (meeting all legal requirements to propose candidates), 
representation (winning seats) and relevance (having influence). The latter phase is the most 
difficult to interpret and can be defined narrowly (governing relevance), but also more 
broadly adding blackmail potential to mere coalition potential of parties (Sartori, 2005). 
Blackmail potential refers to the power of opposition parties to intimidate coalition parties 
and influence the direction of party competition.  
Local New Politics Parties 
By combing theories on New Politics Parties, local lists and political parties we have 
developed a theoretical framework for studying local New Politics Parties. Similar to their 
national counterparts local New Politics Parties consider grassroots democracy and 
participation as a prerequisite for conducting politics. Moreover these parties stress the need 
for evidence-based policy-making, based on public interests and post-material values. They 
position themselves as outsiders by opposing the traditional parties. However, since their 
policy-seeking orientation it can be assumed that they will come to aspire to government 
participation at a certain point in time. Analogous to the presumption that new (green) parties 
are likely to drop their outsider status to become acceptable potential coalition partners 
(Poguntke, 2002; Rihoux, 2006; Bolleyer, 2008), this anticipatory adaptation could also be 
expected for local New Politics Parties, having repercussions on their functioning as an 
organisation and their relations with other political actors in the party system. Adaptation 
would imply tempering anti-establishment rhetoric and shifting the programmatic profile to 
the centre, thus more and more resembling mainstream parties. However a meltdown could 
also be anticipated. Several authors pointed out the electoral risks of anti-cartel parties losing 
their credibility by becoming part of the once loathed establishment (Katz & Mair, 2002; 
Bélanger).  
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3. Three cases explored 
3.1 Methodological approach 
The results described in this paper are based on the qualitative analysis of three cases. These 
cases were selected from a broader sample
2
 of local lists drawn in the context of an 
exploration of the internal variation and meaning of local lists for local politics. A first 
qualitative analysis of this initial sample revealed local New Politics Parties as a specific sub-
type of local lists based on shared contend and style. This observation led us to further 
examine this specific type of local lists. 
The following three cases were selected for qualitative analysis
3
 based on in-depth interviews 
with party-elites and content analysis of party documents. 
 GLIM: Goed Leven in Malle (Good Living in Malle)  
 GPS: Groen Progressief Sociaal Stekene (Green Progressive Social Stekene) 
 ZAP: Zottegems alternatieve ploeg (Alternative team of Zottegem) 
The interviews were conducted by the end of 2010, were then transcribed and analyzed 
qualitatively with the software programme NVivo.  
Successively the cases’ lifecycle, the functions they perform and their implications for the 
local party systems will be described.  
3.2 Goed Leven In Malle (GLIM) 
‘…we experienced that people felt a need, that they didn’t know the channels to the local council, 
where  decisions were made based on power positions and not on knowledge or expertise… That 
really was a basic need: the lack of participation and also the complete absence of environmental 
policy, it really was a waste field.’ (Lowie Van Doninck, council member, GLIM) 
 
3.2.1 Lifecycle 
 
Declaration: By the end of the eighties, a group of young engaged people active in Malle’s4  
local associational life (new social movement) founded GRIM (Group on Participation and 
environment) because they were dissatisfied with local policy. Malle had been governed for 
decades by a Christian-Democratic majority (CVP) and GRIM denounced the self-evidence 
of that power position and its perceived excrescences (inertia, arrogance, corruption). In 
particular GRIM argued for more citizen involvement and more consideration of 
                                                          
2
 The initial selection was based on estimated variation and contained 7 local lists. This selection proved to be 
less divers than expected, demonstrating the difficulty to assess internal variation based on superficial 
(nominal) criteria.  
3
 A forth case of a local New Politics Party (‘Vanonderuit’ from Mechelen) was not retained in the final 
selection for in-depth analysis because this local list has not been able to surpass the electoral coefficient and 
have candidates elected.  
4
 Malle is an urbanized rural municipality with 14608 inhabitants. 
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environmental themes on the local policy agenda. 
Authorization: GRIM was founded in the build-up to the local elections of 1988. The 
initiators searched for moral support and were able to gather sufficient sympathizers for 
submitting a candidate list. 
Representation: GRIM could promptly send two representatives to the council with 11,5% of 
the votes. From the opposition chairs the council members focussed on participation and 
environmental topics. That first legislature GRIM was able to mature and though still firmly 
anchored in associational life, they outgrew their left-progressive profile by integrating 
sympathising people from broader civil society circles (youth movement, employee 
organizations, …). The subsequent elections (1994) a broadened candidate list was proposed 
and GRIM doubled its representatives to 4. 
Relevance: Considering the 1994 election results, GRIM together with the VLD-DBM cartel 
(DBM = Democratic Movement Malle, another local list in Malle) could break the 
dominance of the CVP and form an alternative government coalition (DBM providing the 
mayor). GRIM’s opposition experience and expertise was eagerly valued by their coalition 
partners who had little political experience and very limited policy propositions. GRIM was 
able to put a substantive stamp on local policy during the next 6 years providing a dominant 
contribution to the coalition’s policy programme5, two alderman and the president of the 
social department. The next elections (2000) however GRIM lost 1 seat which was attributed 
to a charismatic and present mayor outshining their aldermen. This electoral loss made them 
no longer mathematically required to form a coalition but DBM included them nevertheless 
as surplus partner in their coalition to secure a local counterweight to the nationally organized 
CD&V6. GRIM provided 1 alderman as well as the president of the local social service, thus 
maintaining obvious relevance. That period reflections were made on their name which was 
supposed to have a negative and old-fashioned undertone. Just prior to the 2006 elections 
GRIM decided to change into GLIM (Good Living in Malle) thereby sharpening their 
independent and positive profile and appealing to a broader public. This new look did not 
generate the aspired results, partly attributed to the national profile of some individual 
candidates combined with a growth in protest votes for the extreme-right party Vlaams 
Belang. Only two candidates got elected and GLIM returned to opposition seats, once more 
facing the relevance threshold.  
 
Recently GLIM is confronted with a decline of active members (illness, deceased, moved, ...)   
and insufficient flow-through of new members weakening the core-group of party members. 
To compensate this decline of the indispensable Party on the Ground, strategic solutions are 
needed. GLIM hesitantly decided to abandon its local profile and to affiliate with the 
ideologically close national green party (GROEN!). The professional national Party in 
Central Office will assume the party functions (organization, coordination, communication) 
necessary for continuation of local political action. Moreover, the local group also considers 
                                                          
5
 GRIM’s comprehensive policy programme was mainly adopted by the other coalition partners, who lacked 
elaborated policy proposals of their own.  
6
 The DBM-VLD cartel was abandoned due to profiling conflicts. The Christian Democrats (renamed CD&V) re-
entered local government in Malle to compensate the VLD exit.  
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forming a cartel with the local socialists (sp.a), equally balancing on the verge of the 
relevance threshold with only one elected representative.  
 
3.2.2 Functions 
From the beginning programmatic functions were of prior concern for GRIM. Participation 
and environmental issues constitute the ideological basis of the party programme. Since their 
participation in government, social issues were added. Grassroots democracy and evidence-
based council work (contrary to existing arbitrariness) have been the guiding principles for 
GRIM/GLIM’s. GRIM/GLIM is dedicated to upward input from party members and an open 
debate culture with a low participation threshold. No formal membership rules exist; 
everybody interested is invited to join internal decision procedures, resulting in a very fluid 
Party on the Ground. GRIM/GLIM’s approach to programmatic functions however slightly 
changed during government participation with a shift in focus from long-term profiling issues 
to short-term implementation issues.  
This grassroots democratic philosophy is equally important in delivering political personnel. 
Formal party positions (executive board, board president, treasurer, secretary) are filled in by 
an open General Assembly but this Party in Central Office is first and foremost dependent on 
the voluntary candidacy of active members. Recruitment is thus more important than 
selection. Board meetings are in general accessible for all members, however a more 
pragmatic interpretation of this grassroots principle was applied in times of government 
participation when closed board meetings were less uncommon, still the mutual 
understanding of confidence between members and board was fundamental. Similarly 
compiling candidate lists and attributing political mandates (party in public office) happens 
by consultation. When elected, representatives are assisted in their mandate by the core group 
of active members who not only provide content input, but also strategic instructions. The 
Party in Public Office is thus coordinated and guided by the Party on the Ground, which 
converges with the Party in Central Office. The position of the party in public office became 
more substantial in times of government participation which widened the distance between 
Party in Public Office (especially the alderman) and Party on the Ground.  
Civil functions are less central to GRIM/GLIM, attributed to personal characteristics, 
preference for programmatic issues and lack of resources. Initially festivities were organized 
on a regular basis for providing the much needed financial resources for basic operational 
activities. These events also had an important socializing and integrative function by offering 
visibility to the party and its political issues. Yet the increasing number of mandates uplifted 
the financial capacities (increasing contributions) and reduced the need for profit-making 
activities. An important source of local embedment consequently faded away. During the 
wealthy times of public office a party leaflet was distributed a few times a year, but since the 
return to opposition seats the frequency of communication is lowered to only one folder every 
two years. 
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3.2.3 Implications for the local party system 
In 1994 GRIM played an important role in changing the party system by breaking down the 
established predominant system in which the CVP had had a majority for centuries. A 
moderate pluralist party system came into place. The local party system will alter again in the 
next elections as a result of GLIM’s decision to face the voter as a local division of GROEN! 
In a cartel with sp.a. The party system will change not so much in numerical terms, for 
affiliating with GROEN should offer the local group new possibilities for meeting the 
representation threshold – but especially in terms of an increasing nationalization of the local 
party system.   
 
3.3 Groen Progressief Sociaal Stekene (GPS) 
‘I always say: I have a text writer, I have a producer and in the local council I am but the actor’ 
(Jan Van Remoortel, council member, GPS) 
 
3.3.1 Lifecycle 
Declaration: By the end of the seventies a group of young people – a lot of them active in 
Flemish-catholic associational life - founded a local political movement named “De Wakkere 
Burger” (the Alert Citizen) in Stekene7. This movement was first of all concerned with 
participation and local democratization and aimed to put pressure on existing local political 
structures.  
Authorization: Part of this political movement was adopted by traditional parties by 
integrating militants on existing candidate lists. The other part judged the democratising 
niche to be insufficiently incorporated by traditional parties en opted for a new alternative 
list. They sought affiliation with the national ecologist party and faced the voter in 1982 as a 
local division of Agalev.  
Representation: A vote share of 5,3% in 1982 was not sufficient to have candidates elected 
and it was not until 2000 that the candidate list of Agalev-Stekene won a first seat in council 
with a 7,2% vote share. 
Relevance: Any coalition potential was basically non-existent with only one council member 
(notwithstanding the fact that GPS had been used during coalition negotiations to put 
pressure on potential government partners). Similarly GPS’s blackmail potential was rather 
restricted. Because of this limited relevance, a local cartel with sp.a was considered in the 
build-up to the council elections of 2006. However, after thorough internal discussion the 
local group decided not to and to face the voter under own steam. At the same time they 
decided to open up and localize by cutting the link with Groen! (former AGALEV). A new 
name - GPS Stekene (Green Progressive Social Stekene) – was assumed to emphasize a local 
and independent profile in order to attract independent candidates. Notwithstanding this 
localization, informal ties with the national party remained important for logistic support 
(capacity building, financing of printed matter). The broadened profile did not have the 
                                                          
7
 Stekene is a rural municipality with 16809 inhabitants. 
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anticipated results and in 2006 GPS had to settle again for one elected candidate, maintaining 
the relevance question unanswered. With the 2012 elections in mind the possibility of a local 
cartel with Sp.a is for a second time considered, hoping to increase policy relevance. 
 
3.3.2 Functions 
For GPS As well programmatic functions are the most important, the main subject of 
oppositional work being the manner of local policy making. GPS’s discourse is directed 
against the arbitrariness of mainstream politics and the lack of participation possibilities. GPS 
argues that advisory bodies are neglected or manipulated, political opposition is not taken 
seriously and local positions are abused by the local elite to advantage own kith and kin. 
Objectifying and substantiating policy decisions are deemed essential. Opposition work is 
mainly reactive; Policy decisions are judged on meeting GPS’s ideological priorities: 
participation and democracy, but also environment, culture, mobility. Due to a limited Party 
in Public Office (only 1 opposition council member) and the high degree of technicality of 
council files and policy decisions, little capacity is at hand for suggesting proactively policy 
alternatives. By acting as a thorn in one’s side GPS aims to increase its blackmail potential 
and put pressure on existing policymakers. With limited success however due to a strong 
anchored divide between majority and opposition. The local government reproaches GPS an 
unconstructive attitude and a hindering effect on policymaking and attempted to neutralize 
GPS by offering an executive position to the one and only council member. 
Positional functions are first of all limited to recruiting sympathisers to figure on the 
candidate list or to participate in internal structures. The Party on the Ground is easily 
accessible and not formally organized, but very involved with council work. In practice only 
a limited group of active members gather at regular basis to decide on the strategic and 
content lines and organize activities. In election times, the core group can fall back on a 
larger group of supporters who are willing to assist in campaigning activities, but don’t wish 
to be intensively involved in the party’s everyday work. Political positions (Party in Public 
Office) are (is) very time-consuming and little sought after. Selection conflicts therefore are 
rather rare. The tasks and responsibilities of the council member are relieved by the highly 
esteemed input of the core group and cooperation with locale civil society organizations for 
developing council files. This vast range of duties for the core group requires a big 
engagement of active members and GPS as well is confronted with limited flow-through of 
new people, pressuring the viability of GPS. 
Because of inadequate financial resources, communication with society (civil functions) is 
limited. Although GROEN! is willing to support GPS for the production of party leaflets, 
election campaigns are rather moderate and even amateurish, making it difficult to compete 
with bigger parties who have more campaigning resources.  
3.3.2 Implications for the local party system 
By opting for a local profile in 2006, GPS has contributed to a localization of Stekene’s party 
system (in nominal terms). 4 candidate lists out of 7 faced the voter with a local name. 
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Furthermore GPS (and the preceding local Agalev-division) has had little impact on the 
institutionalized two-party system. The two big political parties (CD&V and 
Gemeentebelangen) experience little pressure from the fractionalized opposition. Moreover 
they consider GPS as an irritating and delaying factor. their limited relevance impels GPS to 
consider forming a cartel. By cooperating with Sp.a they hope for a greater blackmail or even 
coalition potential, for 1 + 1 can be 3 in the Imperiali-system. Depending on their electoral 
results this cartel could indeed make one of the two big traditional parties redundant and yet 
drastically change the local party system.  
 
3.4 Zottegems Alternatieve Ploeg (ZAP) 
“… we are what you could call a grassroots democratic movement, everybody has an equal say, 
whether you have been a council member for years, or the party’s president. That’s because we have 
no party structure … Therefore we are not a party, we are more like a team, a kind of anarchistic 
collective in which everybody interested can participate. Positioning this as left or right, no, that’s 
very difficult, democratic however yes …”  (Tom Carnewal, council member ZAP) 
 
3.3.1 Lifecycle 
Declaration: Zap was established in the second half of the nineties by a group of people from 
different settings (a lot of them independent but also some ex-politicians from Volksunie and 
Agalev) sharing a general indignation over the political inertia resulting from Zottegem’s8 
bipolar party system
9
. This initiating group outlined a charter for better local policymaking in 
Zottegem, based on the principles of independence, environment, grassroots democracy, 
youth, culture and consideration for  formally independent municipalities.  
Authorization: Based on this charter, supporters were sought and found to submit a candidate 
list for the local elections of 2000. 
Representation: With a vote share of 10,2% in 2000, ZAP acquired two seats in local council. 
In the subsequent elections of 2006 several candidates backed out to stand (again) for a 
national list: former N-VA candidates joined CD&V, while greens decided to face the voter 
with a separate GROEN!-list. In the end ZAP experienced little damage of this increased 
fractionalization of the opposition and had two candidates elected again. 
Relevance: With only 2 council members in opposition, ZAP has to seek relevance in its 
blackmail potential. By behaving as a ‘thorn in the side’ they seek to introduce democratic 
and post-material values in local policy. Yet, in order to strengthen its coalition relevance, 
ZAP aspires to form a local cartel with other smaller political parties. Limiting the 
oppositions discord could make it possible to rupture the established party system and 
establish an alternative majority. 
 
                                                          
8
 Zottegem is a centre municipality with 24877 inhabitants. 
9
 Despite being the largest party, sp.a had been in opposition for two legislatures due to the other two 
traditional parties cvp and pvv, connecting their fate. Their policy was little coherent, and consequently 
continuously dashed by the frustrated sp.a.     
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3.4.1 Functions 
Programmatic functions are of prior concern for ZAP. From the very beginning they intended 
to propose a democratic alternative for the rooted chasm between opposition and majority. 
The ideological charter remained the programmatic base. Policy decisions and alternative 
propositions are evaluated by the charter’s principles. Basically ZAP argues that  local policy 
should be based on public interest and framed by a coherent, long-term vision. 
Even more then the two previous cases, internal organization is based on grassroots 
democratic principles, welcoming everybody to join discussions and participate in the 
decision processes. Again thus the Party on the Ground constitutes the heart of the party 
steering the restricted Party in Public Office. Because of the few representatives and the 
enormous amount of council files, bottom-up input from active members is crucial for the 
quality of their work. Being a small party, ZAP has little financial resources and no 
professional Party in Central Office. A Board is appointed, but the General Assembly takes 
all decisions and is freely accessible.  
Since the limited positions in Public and Central office (only 2 council members), the 
positional functions are mainly concerned with recruiting and preserving volunteer members. 
The vast engagement needed from the core group makes it difficult to keep active members 
motivated. ZAP anticipates that this positional function and the selection aspect in particular, 
will become more important in case of majority participation. ZAP’s grassroots ground rules 
prescribe that even then selection will occur by a process of internal consultation. 
For fulfilling its civil functions, ZAP tries to assure a certain embedment in local society with 
limited resources. They mainly use electronic means for distributing information about 
council work (website, electronic newsletter, network sites). Moreover twice a year a 
profitable social event is organized (cheese and wine, tapas) which underlines municipal 
presence. 
3.3.3 Implications for the local party system 
ZAP explicitly denies to be a party, on organizational and ideological grounds. First of all 
their internal decision making structures are deemed fundamentally different than in 
traditional parties in which a small group has decisional power. Moreover they argue not to 
have the ideological straitjacket and associated rank and file which confine traditional parties. 
But even though ZAP opposes party politics, they act as functional equivalent for local 
parties fulfilling similar functions. The impact of ZAP in the party system in Zottegem has 
been rather constricted. However their presence and electoral success modified the local party 
system from a rigid bipolar system to a more segmented plural party system, yet without 
much impact on the governmental context. In 2012 ZAP aspires to force an innovation of the 
local party system by arranging an opposition cartel and cracking the established majority of 
CD&V and Open-VLD. 
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4 Local New Politics Parties (NPP’s) dissected.  
The three cases unambiguously allowed to distinguish local New Politics parties as a 
particular type of local lists. In the following section we will elaborate on the specific nature 
of this type of local lists by first concentrating on their particular content and style. 
Subsequently the nationalisation and partisanship dimension of these local parties will be 
interpreted. 
4.1 Content and style 
New political cleavages  
Local New Politics Parties are built upon the central concept of democracy determining  their 
programmatic profile as well as their internal structure. They have extra-parliamentary 
origins, initiated by a small group of intellectual and engaged people who felt dissatisfied 
with established policy making and proposed a democratic party-political alternative. The 
initiators often have roots in local civil society, however also a party background is not 
uncommon (principally VU, sp.a and Groen!). Classic ideological cleavages are deemed 
irrelevant and a new democratic versus undemocratic cleavage is introduced in local politics. 
Local New Politics Parties contend that local policy should be based on democratic processes 
and founded on a policy vision taking the public interest as departure point. On top of this 
democratic cleavage some new issues are highlighted such as environment, housing, youth, 
poverty. They take a post-material stance opposed to established material ideologies of the 
government cartel. Furthermore local New Politics Parties often defend smaller formerly 
independent communities who risk receiving less attention from centralistic government.  
“in first instance we mainly focused on participation, making our community more democratic and we 
also continued to stress environmental issues mainly with environmental planning policy, and then the 
whole social aspect has entered our work, focussing more on poverty alleviation and senior policy as 
important spearheads”  (Lowie Van Doninck, council member GLIM) 
Democratic organisation 
This particular focus on democratic principles translates into democratic organization 
structures. Local New Politics Parties distinguish themselves from traditional parties by the 
role played by party members
10
. Every supporter or interested citizen is welcome to 
participate in internal discussions. However a limited core group of active party members 
gathers on a regular basis to set out the content and strategic lines of the party and to organize 
activities. The support of this core group is indispensable for the work of the few councillors 
who also maintain contacts with civil society to strengthen their council files. In election 
times the core group can rely on a broader undercurrent of sympathizers implementing 
campaigning activities. Therefore the Party on the Ground is a rather fluid compilation of 
more or less involved supporters performing a dominant role in the party. The active 
                                                          
10
 The notion of ‘party member’ can be broadened to the citizen in general since a formal member structure 
does not exist and thresholds for participation to internal discussions are very low.  
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members not only steer the Party in Public Office, they also assume several organization, 
coordination and communication tasks since an official Party in Central Office is absent due 
to the small-scale nature and lack of financial recourses (no subsidies).   
 “ For some time we worked with real members. However that was quite an administrative burden 
every year again and so we switched to a mere list of sympathizers which we adapted every now and 
again. We then contacted the people on that list when we organized something or needed help” 
(Lowie Van Doninck, council member GLIM) 
Policy-seeking objectives  
Local New Politics parties in first instance can be interpreted as (instrumental) vote-seeking 
parties. Like all other political actors they aim to win as much votes as possible when 
participating in elections. Election campaigns are elaborated to promote their programme and 
candidates and to convince the voter. Due to limited resources they experience difficulties to 
compete with traditional parties who can use the contributions from well-paid executive 
functions and/or financial and logistic resources from the national mother-party to set up big 
campaigns. Fundamentally however local New Politics Parties are policy-seeking parties 
aiming to introduce their priorities in local policy. Maximizing vote share is instrumental to 
the intrinsic policy seeking goal as depicted in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Strategic goal of local new Politics parties. 
The analyses enables us to refine this interpretation of instrumental and intrinsic goals. The 
data suggest an alteration of instrumental goals depending on the parties experiences in local 
politics and thus the course of their lifecycle. The figure below illustrates a path-dependency 
model of local New Politics Parties’ strategic goals based on Pedersen’s life cycle approach 
(1982). 
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Figure 2: Path-dependency model explaining shifts in strategic goals of local New Politics Parties 
Local New Politics Parties competing in elections for the first time aim to break up the 
established party system and existing power structures by offering a substantive alternative. 
‘Power breaking’ is introduced in this model as instrumental objective in view of local New 
Politics parties’ policy seeking goals. Once having representatives elected in council 
(representation) they mainly concentrate on their blackmail potential as anti-establishment 
parties and initially demonstrate little governmental ambitions. Participation in majority 
however gets esteemed higher after some time in opposition, since legislative initiative is 
dominated by the executive in parliamentary systems and policy influence of opposition 
parties remains limited (Bolleyer, 2008). This model therefore nuances the intrinsic policy-
seeking dimension by differentiating between policy-shaping objectives (touching up policy) 
and policy-making objectives (co-designing policy). After some time local New Politics 
Parties’ council members consider their situation to be inadequate for realizing their policy-
shaping objectives. Feelings of frustration bring them to adjust their strategic goals from 
policy-shaping to policy-making. However, policy-making requires government mandates. 
Local New Politics parties therefore orient themselves more and more to office-seeking goals 
in order to gain access to executive power. Again the office-seeking objectives should be 
interpreted as instrumental goals. Local New Politics Parties in essence remain policy-
seeking parties considering access to government as a means for having bigger impact on 
local policy. Since electoral legislation favours bigger parties, this office-seeking objectives 
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stimulates local New Politics Parties to form cartels, a tendency which will be discussed in 
more detail further on. 
 “I am a real opposition man, I love to give comment and indicate stuff, but if I would be a good 
policy man? I think that would fit me less, but indeed the aim is to change things. Just yesterday, I had 
a discussion on ‘slow roads’, that’s another workshop I followed, you can’t imagine what kind of 
answers they give. So then you would be able to realize things like that, right” (Jan Van Remoortel, 
council member GPS) 
4.2 Partisanship and nationalisation 
Partisanship: different but the same 
“ZAP is an alternative for rusted traditional parties for whom governing is equal to preparing the 
next elections,  and not for serving public interest”  (ZAP Charter) 
Local New Politics Parties oppose themselves to mainstream parties at the local level and 
employ a specific discourse questioning the existing local party system and more in particular 
the established political culture. Not the democratic principle of political parties is mistrusted 
but critics concern the primacy of individual and party concerns of the political elite. They 
strongly denounce the personal and pork barrel character of local politics. These anti-party 
sentiments are also fed by the absence of bottom-up processes for policy making. According 
to local new Politics parties mainstream policy is arbitrary (ill-founded) and undemocratic. 
Local new politics parties thus can be interpreted as specific anti party-system parties 
(Poguntke, 1996). Following Katz and Mair (1995; 2002) they can also be interpreted as anti-
cartel parties, reacting against a local variety of the cartelization trend in which political 
parties increasingly resemble each other (electorally, programmatically, in their goals, their 
style, …) and cooperate to promote shared interests in terms of government potential and the 
resulting financial benefits. However, despite their anti-establishment character, they present 
themselves as functional equivalents of local divisions of national parties and perform similar 
functions. They should thus be interpreted as political parties, but they show different 
accents. Katz and Mair (1995, 2002) have described the evolution of traditional parties into 
‘cartel parties’ characterised by a dominant role for the Party in Public Office, an increasing 
distance to party members and a decline of the representative function. As opposed to this 
evolution of traditional parties, local New Politics Parties show a dominance of the members 
and a significant concern for the representative role with a focus on grassroots democratic 
principles. Local New Politics Parties are rather small (mostly opposition) parties with a 
limited Party in Public Office and a non-professional Party in Central Office, based on 
voluntary engagement of active members. Positional functions (assigning positions within the 
party) consequently are rather limited while Katz and Mair (2005) demonstrated the 
importance of this function in traditional cartel parties. Local embedment and civil functions 
are important to local New Politics Parties however they lack resources to invest in a 
sustained local presence.  
Local new politics parties thus walk a thin line between opposing themselves to traditional 
parties and aiming to fit in and be part of the party political game. Moreover we witness their 
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distinguishing characteristics fainting somewhat in times of government participation. 
Pragmatic considerations then lead them to act more and more like their counterparts. 
“ Political success also urges you to modify your political ideas somewhat, to make room for new 
things more in the direction of the centre” (Lowie Van Doninck, council member, GLIM) 
localisation 
Basically local New Politics Parties can be interpreted as independent from national parties. 
They assume a local and independent profile, mainly resulting from the perceived irrelevance 
of classic left-right divides in a local context. Yet informal or individual links with national 
parties are not uncommon. The electoral horizon of local political elites is not restricted to the 
local context and political preferences, as well as political networks beyond their locality are 
likely. Pragmatic motives (see beyond) can incite local new Politics parties to tighten these 
informal links at the expense of their independent profile and probably their electoral 
success
11
.  
Mimicry or meltdown? 
Local New Politics Parties are confronted with two fundamental problems threatening their 
survival. Firstly they continuously balance on the verge of political relevance and have to 
fight a constant battle to increase their relevance. Due to their relative limited electoral 
weight
12
 coalition potential remains restricted (local New Politics Parties are generally 
opposition parties) and relevance has to come from their capacity to put pressure on the 
policy-making process (blackmail potential). Local contextual factors could put them in a 
position of holding the balance and being involved in coalition negotiations, but these 
circumstances are mostly coincidental.  
A second fundamental problem confronting local New Politics parties is a decline of the 
crucial Party on the Ground. Despite their numerical weakness, council members of local 
New Politics Parties have an ambitious policy-seeking agenda. They are focused on 
substance and attach great importance to well-founded policy making. Yet, the amount and 
the increasing complexity of council work, together with the limited access to information 
from government makes the small local New Politics Parties dependent of external input. 
Since a professional Party in Central Office is absent, council members need to rely on the 
Party on the Ground which takes care of strategic, content-related and organizing support for 
their representatives in council. These tasks however require a serious engagement and time-
investment from party members. The loss of some veterans (illness, deceases, movements, ...) 
as well as an insufficient flow-through of new members13 causes the required engagement to 
become ever more rare and local New Politics Parties experiencing ever more problems to 
keep an active core group up and running. This tendency is attributed to a changing societal 
                                                          
11
 Interviewed party-elites ascribe a larger electoral appeal to local lists with independent profile.  
12
 The studied cases generally fluctuate around a vote-share of 10%. Only GRIM could count on a bigger vote-
share in their heydays (17%) and was included in the coalition.   
13
 Despite local New Politics Parties’ popularity with younger age-cohorts.  
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context and a new conception of political engagement, an argument supported by the 
hypothesis of post-modern citizenship (Dejaeghere, Y. & Hooghe M.; 2006) stating that the 
‘monitorial citizen’ is still keeping an eye on the political processes, however without making 
structural use of classic participation channels such as political parties. 
Confronted with these two challenges, local New Politics Parties are forced to find strategic 
solutions guaranteeing their continued existence. As illustrated in Figure 3 the observed 
coping strategies contain particular forms of collaboration with national or local parties 
resulting in a shift to the left on the nationalisation and/or partisanship dimension of the 
NAPA-model and thus a rapprochement to traditional parties. 
 
Figure 3: challenges and  coping-strategies of local New Politics Parties 
Local New Politics Parties can opt for local collaboration with other parties to strengthen 
their coalition potential and relevance
14
. The choice for cooperation with local political actors 
can be explained by the increased office-seeking ambitions combined with the institutional 
context (Imperiali, favouring bigger parties or constellations) and limited resources to 
compete with traditional parties. Joining a cartel also implies giving up part of your 
independence, however since the shift towards more office-seeking oriented goals, the 
possibility of government participation is anticipated, including the need for making 
concessions to other majority parties. Ideological adjacent parties are evident potential 
partners but also more distant parties are considered (ZAP aims for a cartel with Groen! as 
well as N-VA and open-VLD).  
 “When forming part of a majority you will not be alone as well and if I sit there with CD&V, I will 
also have to pour water by the wine and eventually we will have to come to a compromise which will 
hopefully be not too much of a freak and which will be defendable for all parties concerned. A bench 
of aldermen always acts in collegiality so speaking of a cartel list or a coalition doesn’t make too 
much of a difference isn’t it”.” (Tom Carnewal, council member, ZAP) 
Secondly, in compensation for the declining Party on the Ground, local New Politics Parties 
can seek affiliation with an ideologically related national party. Since ecological parties have 
                                                          
14
 all analyzed cases have decided on or were exploring a cartel formula in the run-up to the 2012 elections 
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their origins in the same democratization niche and likewise stress the importance of 
participation processes and post-material issues (Frankland, Lucardie en Rihoux, 2008), 
Groen! appears to be a logic choice for affiliation, as demonstrated by the case studies
15
. 
Nationalisation means that the national Party in Central Office can offer the much needed 
logistic and financial support to the local group. Exceptionally the local name and a certain 
independency can be sustained (cfr. GPS Stekene) but in most cases affiliation signifies 
conversion into a local division of the national party (cfr. GLIM, Malle). This also means 
(partly) abandoning its independence and singularity, including the anticipated negative 
electoral consequences. This coping strategy is perceived as a sheer necessity and only 
reluctantly chosen for in order to avoid a meltdown.   
 “The coming elections we stand as Groen!... In a local party you have to work very hard, you have to 
write statutes, assure revenues, make leaflets, folders in which you tell what you and we were very 
good in that … And then why are we switching now, just because of a lack of man power and 
insufficient flow-through of younger people to put up the same thing, be involved in politics in the 
same way. It’s a pure necessity” (Lowie Van Doninck, council member, GLIM) 
  
                                                          
15
 Two of the three case studies sought affiliation with GROEN!, but this strategy could also be possible with 
other national parties at the left.  
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4 Conclusions 
Based on an in-depth study of three cases this paper argues the existence of local New 
Politics Parties as a specific type of local lists and searches for explanatory factors to clarify 
its origins, features and developments.   
Local New Politics parties are characterized by their focus on participation and grass-roots 
democracy as an ideological as well as an organizational project, introducing a new (post-
material) ideological cleavage in local politics. Local New Politics parties are basically 
policy-seeking parties aiming for a fundamental change in local policy. They can be 
interpreted as local anti-party-system parties due to their discourse against the established 
political culture in which individual and party interests are perceived to prevail. Initially they 
position themselves as political outsiders, challenging the established political system, 
however without questioning the concept of political parties.  
The data confirms the hypothesis of anticipatory adaptation (Poguntke, 2002). A shift in 
instrumental strategic objectives of local New Politics parties can be observed as their 
lifecycle progresses. Political ambitions increases and mere policy-shaping objectives are 
replaced by policy-making objectives requiring government participation. In order to increase 
credibility as potential coalition partner (Deschouwer, 2008; Bolleyer, 2008) the initial anti-
establishment status is fading and an approaching to traditional parties can be observed in the 
form of local cartel formulas or even affiliation with national parties. 
However this mimicry is not only inspired by the new office-seeking objectives and 
reinforced by the legislative context. It should also be understood as an attempt to prevent a 
collapse. A specific feature of local New Politics Parties is their grassroots character. The 
active nucleus of voluntary members forms the heart of the party assuming most of the party 
functions. However the cases suggest the untenable nature of this intensive role for party 
members. Local New Politics Parties experience difficulties to find active members willing to 
invest time and energy to bear the organizational costs of legislative power. These findings 
contradict the conclusion of Frankland, Lucardie en Rihoux (2008) suggesting a 
professionalization of the Party in Public Office and the Party in Central Office who 
increasingly behave as traditional parties, while the Party on the Ground remains rooted in 
the amateur-activist model based on grass-roots democratic principles. The stability of the 
active role of party members is stressed as a result of activists’ persistent claim for grassroots 
politics. At the local level we found no evidence for a sustained commitment to this kind of 
grassroots democracy. On the contrary party members seem to have lost their interest in this 
role. To compensate for this declining activism local New Politics Parties can opt for 
collaboration with other (national) parties having enough resources to assume the party 
functions. This option could be interpreted as a internal differentiation and 
professionalization of the head of the party as suggested by Frankland et al. (2008). The cases 
suggest Groen! being an obvious choice to affiliate with for local New Politics parties 
because the comparable ideological origins in grassroots democratic demands. These findings 
also suggests local new Politics parties being part of the territorial development of the 
national party Groen! however the case of ZAP, who has no links with the ecologist party 
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suggests this is not always the case. More detailed research into the prevalence of this 
development is needed for further conclusions.  
The observed aim for cooperation with national and local political actors demonstrate an 
obvious mainstreaming of local New Politics Parties confirming the suggested tendency to 
moderate their anti-establishment profile (Poguntke, 2002; Rihoux, 2006; Bolleyer, 2008). 
However little evidence is found for the suggested moderation of programmatic profile while 
holding legislative power. Executive power on the contrary does imply a slack in the 
programmatic profile as well as in the organisational principle of consensual decision-making 
as illustrated by the case of GLIM. These observations also validate Bolleyer suggestion that 
the growing organisational costs of public office (especially executive) impels new parties to 
professionalize and institutionalise.  
This paper has dealt with only one type of local lists and gives a first contribution to a better 
understanding of the meaning of the internal variation hidden under the general appellation of 
local lists. Obviously further research is needed - quantitative as well as qualitative - for 
revealing the meaning and evolutions of other types of local lists as well and to map their 
prevalence in Belgium and in comparative perspective. 
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